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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERESTINA MARTIN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 14492 
SAFEWAY STORES, INCORPORATED, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a suit for personal injury sustained as a result 
of a slip and fall on a spot of ice on a sidewalk outside a 
Safeway grocery store. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, 
District Court Judge of the Third Judicial District. At 
the conclusion of all the evidence the trial court directed 
a verdict of no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the trial court's decision. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff/Appellant!s statement of facts is inaccurate 
in several respects. 
It is uncontroverted that on January 13, 1975 plaintiff 
fell and was injured outside a grocery store owned by Safeway 
Stores, Incorporated (hereinafter "Safeway"). 
It had been snowing intermittently throughout the day, 
(R. 27-28; 81; 186). Safeway employees had cleaned and 
salted the sidewalk at 2;00 P.M. and again at 5;00 P.M. 
(R. 82; ?5; 168). The Safeway employees kept the sidewalk 
as clean as possible so as to avoid water being tracked in 
that would later have to be mopped. (R. 168-169). 
Between 5:00 P.M. and the time that plaintiff fell, 
Bruce Hudson, a Safeway courtesy clerk carrying groceries 
out of the store for customers, walked over the area where 
the plaintiff fell some twenty to thirty times. He did not 
observe it to be slippery or icy, although it was wet. 
(R. 185) . 
The evidence at trial was conflicting as to exactly 
where the plaintiff fell, but the evidence taken in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff indicates that the ice 
formed on a spot in the sidewalk where there was slight 
"spalling" or flaking of the concrete. There had been no 
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previous problem of ice or water collecting at this parti-
cular spot. (R. 155). 
The Safeway manager did testify that he has occasion-
ally seen water or snow dropped onto the sidewalk by cars 
which were parked with their hoods protruding slightly over 
the edge of the walkway. (R. 157). 
At one time neon lights were installed in connection 
with the canopy which extended across the store front and 
the Safeway sign. (R. 153). These lights had been inoper-
able for several years prior to the accident. (R. 43). 
There is no evidence that these lights were needed for 
adequate lighting, however. There were two parking lights 
in the immediate area of the accident which were working the 
night of the accident. (R. 151; 185). 
After plaintiff fell the area was examined by the plain-
tiff's husband; Mr. Ruben C. Martinez, a Safeway employee; 
and Mrs. Julaine Gomez, a customer. They found a thin 
transparent spot of ice about twelve inches by fourteen 
inches. (R. 61, 172). 
Either the next morning or the following morning the 
plaintiff's husband returned with a photographer who took 
photographs of the spot where the "spalling" was. (Ex. 1 
and 3). However, the condition was not the same as when 
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plaintiff fell because no ice was present. In fact, the 
place where plaintiff fell could not be located with cer-
tainty* (R. 91). Although plaintiff's expert testified 
i 
that in his opinion the photograph showed salt marks which 
indicated a "high water line", he admitted that he had no 
way of knowing whether the line was left there as a result 
of the ice which caused plaintifffs fall, or on some prior 
occasion. (R. 75). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PLAINTIFF PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW 
HOW LONG THE ICE HAD EXISTED. 
Contrary to the assertions in plaintiff's brief, abso-
lutely no evidence was presented to the trial court tending 
to prove when the transparent ice formed on the walkway. 
All of the evidence admitted at the trial indicated that 
the day of the accident, January 13, 197 5, was a stormy day. 
Mr. Johnson, the manager of the Safeway store testi-
fied: 
Q. (by Mr. Miner) And now the — do you 
recall what the weather was on the 13th 
day of January 1975? 
A. To my recollection it was a stormy day. 
(R. 27-28). 
Mr. Martinez, Safeway!s Inventory Control Clerk, testi-
fied: 
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Q. (by Mr. Miner) Now, what was the weather 
when you went to work? Was it clear or 
snowy or what was the weather? 
A* It was snowy, slushy. (R. 81). 
Mr. Bruce Hudson, Safewayfs courtesy clerk, said that 
when he went to work at 5:00 P.M. the walk was being cleaned. 
He testified as follows: 
Q. (by Mr. Miner) Did I understand that when 
you went to work that somebody was shovel-
ing snow? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Out in front of the store? 
A. Yes. (R. 186). 
This testimony is uncontroverted. The evidence at trial 
established that the employees of defendant shoveled the walk-
way twice during the afternoon; once at 2:00 P.M. and again 
at 5:00 P.M. The walk was salted on each occasion. (R. 89). 
Thereafter the walkway was wet but not icy. One of the Safe-
way employees took special precautions to see that the walk 
was properly cleaned because he wished to prevent customers 
from tracking snow or slush into the store, since he had 
the responsibility of mopping the store after closing, the 
evening of the accident. (R. 169). 
Plaintiff's husband testified that the ice was clear 
and was the same color as the sidewalk and could not be 
seen. (R. 61). Bruce Hudson testified that he had walked 
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past the area of the accident some twenty to thirty times 
that evening and had not observed the presence of any ice. 
(R. 185). Nor had any customers complained of the ice. (R. 
186) • 
Plaintiff presented no evidence to show the temperature, 
or when freezing could have occurred. Further, the walkway 
had been twice salted a few hours earlier, and undoubtedly 
the presence of salt would have prevented freezing at the 
usual freezing temperature. There was no evidence that 
weather conditions were such that the precautions taken by 
the defendant's employees were not reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
No evidence was presented to account for the presence 
of ice on the sidewalk. It may be that water from melting 
snow from the hood of a car dropped onto the sidewalk and 
froze minutes before the accident. In fact, plaintiff!s hus-
band testified that plaintiff fell directly in front of his 
car, which protruded slightly over the walkway. (R. 581). 
Mr. Johnson, the store manager, testified that he has occa-
sionally seen cars drip water on the sidewalk when the warmth 
of the engine caused snow on the hood of the car to melt. 
(R. 156-157). It is significant to note that the icy spot 
was only twelve inches by fourteen inches in area. The entire 
surface of the walkway was not icy as would have been the 
case had the condition causing the formation of the ice been 
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general in nature. Further, the area of the walkway where 
the spalling occurred is much larger than the isolated spot 
of ice described by witnesses. 
A thorough examination of the record will show that 
there is absolutely no credible evidence as to how long the 
ice had existed prior to the accident, or to account for the 
presence of the ice. 
POINT TWO 
A LANDOWNER IS NOT LIABLE FOR A FALL ON 
ICE OR SNOW UNLESS HE FAILS TO MAKE IT 
REASONABLY SAFE WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME 
AFTER THE STORM CEASES. 
This Court expressed itself clearly on this issue in 
Schofield v. Kinzell, 29 Utah2d 427, 511 P.2d 149 (1973). . 
In that case the plaintiff was injured as she walked across 
a snowy parking lot. This court held: 
The landlord is not a guarantor for the 
safety of his tenants as they proceed along the 
common ways. An accumulation of ice or snow 
upon those portions of the premises reserved for 
the common use of his tenants may make the land-
lord liable for injuries sustained by his tenant 
which are due to such an accumulation, provided 
the landlord knows, or should have knox^ n of the 
condition and failed to act within a reasonable 
time thereafter to protect against injuries 
caused thereby. The mere accumulation of snow 
or ice does not ipso facto make the landlord 
liable, he must be given a reasonable time 
after the storm has ceased to remove the accu-
mulations or to take such measures as will make 
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the common areas reasonably safe from those 
conditions which pose an unreasonable risk of 
harm to the user. (Emphasis added)• 
29 Utah 2d at 4 31, 511 P.2d at 151. 
Plaintiff relies upon DeWeese v. J.C. Penny Co., 5 
Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956) as authority for the 
proposition that the issue of negligence should have gone 
to the jury. The situation in DeWeese, however, differs 
from this case in one crucial respect: in DeWeese there 
was evidence that the storm and dangerous condition had 
existed for some time and no remedial effort was undertaken, 
whereas here, there is n<D evidence as to how long the ice 
had been, on the sidewalk, and reasonable efforts, through 
cleaning and salting had been previously and timely undertaken. 
In DeWeese, plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet ter-
razzo floor. The evidence showed that terrazzo was slippery 
when wet and it is customary for store owners with terrazzo 
entrances to use rubber mats during storms. The evidence 
taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff also 
indicated that the storm began 2 5 to 30 minutes before the 
accident. 
Like DeWeese, this case involves a permanent condition 
on the walk: spalling in the concrete. Indeed, there is 
scarcely a walkway in the state of Utah that does not have 
some spalling present. No reasonable mind could conclude 
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that the spalling, standing alone constitutes negligence. 
There was no evidence that this area became icy during pre-
vious storms. In fact, the only evidence was that water 
and ice had not accumulated at this spot previously. (R. 155) . 
Unlike DeWeese, in this case there is n_o evidence as 
to how long the ice had been present on the sidewalk. In 
DeWeese, the plaintiff testified that it had snowed from 
25 to 30 minutes prior to the accident. in this case, 
none of the witnesses testified as to how long the ice 
was present. Nor was evidence presented to account for its 
presence. In fact, the testimony of defendant's witnesses 
was uncontroverted in establishing that the walkway had been 
twice cleared of slush and snow during the afternoon and 
salted on each occasion. Although it remained wet, a condi-
tion which could not be prevented, defendant's employees did 
take such measures as necessary to make the walkway reason-
ably safe. 
POINT THREE 
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT SAFE-
WAY EXERCISED REASONABLE CARE IN SNOW 
REMOVAL. 
The undisputed evidence indicates that the snow was re-
moved from in front of the Safeway store on two occasions during 
the afternoon of January 13, 1975. Mr. Martinez came to work at 
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2:00 P.M. on that day. The first thing he did upon arriving 
was clean the sidewalk. (R. 82). The sidewalk was also 
salted at that time. (R. 168). 
At 5:00 P.M., he again reswept the snow and salted the 
sidewalk. (R. 85, 168). 
Bruce Hudson, the courtesy clerk, passed the spot where 
the small patch of ice was later found on twenty to thirty 
occasions between 5:00 P.M. and the time when the plaintiff 
fell. (R. 185). He did not see the ice on any of those 
occasions. 
Plaintiff's claim that this is evidence of negligence 
in that he should have seen the ice, ignores the fact that 
there is absolutely no evidence that the ice was on the 
sidewalk for any length of time before the plaintiff fell. 
Further, plaintiff's husband testified that the patch of ice 
was clear and blended in with the color of the cement. (R. 61) 
all the other witnesses concurred in this observation. (R. 137 
171; 100). 
POINT FOUR. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE BROKEN NEON 
LIGHTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT. 
It is undisputed that near the walkway there were some 
broken neon lights. These lights had been inoperable for 
several years. (R. 43). There is no evidence, however, 
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that the absence of these lights contributed in any way to 
the accident. 
The evidence is undisputed that there were other lights 
in the parking lot, (R. 151) and that they were on the night 
of the accident. (R. 185). 
There is no evidence that the broken neon lights were 
for any purpose other than decorative* 
POINT FIVE 
PLAINTIFFfS "EXHIBIT 4-P" WAS PROPERLY 
REJECTED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Plaintiff submitted a weather report, showing weather 
conditions at the Salt Lake City Airport in January of 197 5. 
The trial court rejected the exhibit, not because 
weather reports are per se inadmissible, but because the 
weather at the Salt Lake City Airport is immaterial to prove 
the weather in Midvale, Utah, some 2 0 miles away. 
This court held in DeWeese v. J.C. Penny Co., 5 Utah2d 
116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956): 
It is recognized that in this mountain valley 
storms are sometimes spotty and irregular as to 
time and place of starting, duration and amount 
of precipitation. 
5 Utah2d at 122, 297 P.2d at 902. 
The law is clear that in matters of determining mate-
riality the trial court should be accorded a large measure 
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of discretion and should only be reversed if this discretion 
is abused. Throop v. F.E. Young & Co., 94 Ariz. 146, 382 
P.2d 560 (1963); Tucker v. Lower, 2 00 Kan. 1, 434 P.2d 320 
(1967); Gunderson v. Brewster, 154 Mont. 405, 466 P.2d 589 
(1970); Carter v. Moberly, 263 Or. 193, 501 P.2d 1276 (1972). 
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide: 
Rule 45. [T]he judge may in his discretion ex-
clude evidence if he finds that its 
probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the risk that its admission 
will . . . 
(b) create substantial danger of 
undue prejudice or of confusing 
the issues or of misleading the jury. 
The weather report offered as Exhibit "4-P" had very 
little, if any probative value; it created a substantial risk 
of confusing the issues. The judge did not abuse his dis-
cretion in excluding it. 
If plaintiff's attorney felt that it was necessary to 
prove what the weather was on January 13, 197 3, he should 
have done so by the most direct means: by questioning the 
persons who were present on the day of the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
The mountain valleys of the state of Utah contain 
hundreds of miles of concrete sidewalks in varying states 
of repair. Each winter these sidewalks are subjected to a 
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constantly recurring cycle of snow, melting, freezing, thaw-
ing and refreezing. It is virtually impossible to construct 
a sidewalk where ice cannot accumulate. 
This court has wisely determined that property owners 
cannot be insurers of the safety of those who come on their 
property. They should only be held liable for injuries 
caused by ice or snow where it has existed for a long enough 
time that the property owners should have known about it and 
corrected it. 
Here the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to 
show that the danger had existed for any substantial time 
before the accident. Had the trial court permitted these 
issues to go to the jury, any verdict for plaintiff would 
have been required to be based upon speculation and not 
upon the evidence. The trial court exercised its proper 
supervisory powers in determining as a matter of law that 
reasonable minds could not differ in finding that the de-
fendant's employees met their duty under the circumstances 
in making the walkway reasonably safe for those risks 
which could have been observed or anticipated. The trial 
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1 
court rightly directed a verdict of no cause of action, 
Respectfully submitted, 
WORSLEY, SNOW & £HRISTENSEN 
Merlin R. Lybbert 
^ r 4L\\ ' (] 
Scott Daniels 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
7th Floor, Continental Bank Bldg-
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9 000 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Kathryn S. Vass, being duly sworn, says that 
she is employed in the offices of Worsley, Snow and 
Christense, Attorneys for Respondent herein, that 
she served the Brief of Respondent upon Appellant by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an enve-
lope addressed to Mark S. Miner, 219 Felt Building, 
341 Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and 
depositing same, sealed, with first class postage 
prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on the 3rd day of June, 1976. 
c/K-- - v " ( 
Kathryn ~S . Vass 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day 
of June, 1976. 
/ &. ..v.. - ., ^ -
Notary Public, Residing 
At Sa l t Lake City, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
lyJUHlBll 
L * d L i ^ ^ , - . . . ^ v. : 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
